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Abstract: In this paper, we analyze the main characteristics of European SMEs, related to the demand1
for and access to external financial resources. We use microdata from an extensive database, elaborated2
by the European Central Bank and the European Commission: the Survey on the Access to Finance3
of Enterprises. Firstly, we consider a set of variables as determinants to the decision to apply for4
different financial instruments. Secondly, we use the same set of variables to analyze the actual access5
to these instruments. For each regression, several SMEs profiles were created, in order to detect6
SMEs archetypes according to their decisions. The results are thought-provoking, and highlight that7
differences in firms characteristics (size, innovative activities, etc.), influence not only the access to,8
but also the demand for external finance.9
Keywords: Financial Decisions; Innovative Firms; EU; SME10
JEL Classification: G21, G28, O3, O5211
1. Introduction12
The Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are commonly known as the backbone of the real13
economy. They represent 99.8% of all European business, which generate around 58% of the gross14
value added of the corporate sector in Europe. Furthermore, they are responsible for almost 67% of15
private sector employment, which represents 86.8 million people (Kaya (2014)).16
This concern highlights the importance of SMEs growth and their needs for external financing17
and the problems they have to face to solve market barriers.18
In this sense, SMEs financial structure and its determinant is a wide subject of study that has19
changed over time and according to the set of SMEs analyzed, given that many factors affect their20
financial decisions. As it is commonly known, the SMEs financial access is restricted due to large21
information asymmetries, agency risk, scarce physical collaterals, and specific activities and firm’s22
characteristics (Berger and Udell (1998); Briozzo et al. (2016)). In light of the 2008 financial crisis,23
many European markets suffered credit constrained problems. Ferrando et al. (2017) mention that24
investor confidence dropped in the banking sectors of those countries more affected by the turmoil,25
given that their banks tended to assign large portfolios to the debt securities issued by domestic26
sovereigns. Consequently, bank funding increased. Mc Namara et al. (2017) suggest that countries27
lending infrastructure influences SMEs capital structure due to the fact that SMEs debt is higher28
in countries with more efficient insolvency environments in terms of debt rescue and in countries29
with less rigorous regulatory laws because of the lower capital regulatory requirements for banks.30
Submitted to Int. J. Financial Stud., pages 1 – 14 www.mdpi.com/journal/ijfs
Version February 25, 2019 submitted to Int. J. Financial Stud. 2 of 14
Nonetheless, Kaya (2014) supports that SMEs in the countries that are the hardest hit by the recession31
and unemployment problems are those less favorable to get loans given the high level of lending rates.32
Wehinger (2014) analyses the European SMEs and the credit crunch since the 2008 financial crisis33
and highlights that since that event, bank’s perception of growing macro and micro risks have played34
an increasing role in the contraction of business credit standards and have reduced availability of35
external financing, despite countries particularities.36
It is true, that the relationship between innovativeness and the probability to get financed has37
been previously studied. This study investigates if the SMEs financial access depends on the specific38
instrument demanded or on a set of variables that condition SMEs’ profile to decide to apply for39
some specific financial instruments. Moreover, we deepen this aspect by considering the current40
access to the financial line regarding the same set of variables recognized as key determinants of SMEs41
capital structure. However, to the best of our knowledge, there are no others papers that split the42
financial aid application willingness from the financial aid application success. Precisely, this is the43
main contribution of this paper.44
We conducted the empirical study on two homogeneous groups of countries: euro and non-euro45
EU countries.46
Our results are consistent and contribute to the literature in different ways: first, there are no47
similar works that analyze this issue considering such a huge set of European countries, distinguishing48
the dependent variable between applying and accessing, and the different financial instruments.49
Second, the innovation variable is considered given the importance of its characteristic to SMEs50
decisions in line to their needs for external financial access. Third, SMEs profiles have been created in51
order to detect which kind of SMEs is more fortunate to access to specific financial instruments.52
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review of the main SMEs53
capital structure theories and a revision of SMEs’ empirical works related to their capital structure54
decisions. Section 3 describes the data and section 4, the methodology applied for the study. Section55
5 presents the results of the study and discusses the main findings. Finally, Section 6 provides an56
analysis regarding the main conclusions of the work.57
2. Literature Review58
2.1. SMEs financial structure.59
Previous literature studies the sundry traditions usually considered by SMEs in financing their60
activities. Since 1950, capital structure has developed into a controversial research area in the field of61
corporate finance (Forte et al. (2013)).62
One of the traditional debates on this concern comes from Modigliani and Miller (1958), who63
considered that the market value of each enterprise is independent of its capital structure. Some64
years later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) studied the possibility to dismiss the original assumptions of65
perfect competition markets and admit that indebtedness has a tax advantage given that interests are66
deductible from the income tax. Even so, it does not mean that companies must at all times try to use67
debt. The authors highlight the existence of other relevant factors in the financing decisions that are68
not considered within the context of the equilibrium static models.69
In this context, the Trade-off theory raises, and considers the effects of the entire industry (taxes,70
bankruptcy costs and agency problems) and predicts an optimal structure as a result of balancing costs71
and the benefits of issuing debt and capital. In this framework, leverage is considered advantageous72
(under certain conditions) and managers choose to use debt even if there are internal funds available.73
This theory assumes that the optimal capital structure is the result of equalizing the benefits of leverage74
(mainly tax savings) and the costs of financial difficulties. It also proposes to avoid the extreme use of75
leverage and rationalize the indebtedness indexes (Brealey et al. (2006)).76
On the other side, Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the Pecking Order Theory,77
that describes a hierarchy in financing choices and has as central axis the asymmetric information78
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between lenders and borrowers. Due to the fact that companies have more information on their future79
than lenders, the need for control increases borrowing costs, which encourage companies to be financed80
with internal funds in the first place. In this line, companies prefer the reinvestment of profits, in order81
to avoid adverse selection problems. When these funds have been exhausted, companies are financed82
with bank debt, and lastly, in the stock market. The proponents of the Pecking Order Hypothesis83
explain that this hierarchical order is the result of greater flexibility and lower transaction costs of84
internal versus external resources. In this stream, the leverage is considered to be disadvantageous85
compared to the use of internal sources (Briozzo et al. (2016); Martinez et al. (2017)).86
The last financial crisis that burst in 2008 and its consequences and collateral effects spread to87
many European economies and sometime later affected strongly the interbank market. This crucial88
source of liquidity for banks in Europe brought changes in corporate lending, leading to a credit89
crunch in several Eurozone countries (Drehmann and Nikolaou (2013); Iyer et al. (2014)). Many works90
analyze the effects and consequences of the last financial crisis on SMEs development, considering91
that the financial system has been altered, and consequently the financial access of such firms changed92
(Armstrong et al. (2013); Cowling et al. (2012); Lee et al. (2015)).93
Many works have studied the SMEs capital structure during different periods of time, and find94
that, according to different samples of firms, some of them finance their activities in accordance with the95
pecking order (Yazdanfar and Öhman (2015);Balios et al. (2016)). Others highlight the importance of the96
trade-off theory to explain the financial behavior of SMEs (Rossi et al. (2015); Banga and Gupta (2017))97
and some others argue that theories are complementary (Serrasqueiro and Nunes (2012); Serrasqueiro98
and Caetano (2015); Mc Namara et al. (2017)).99
2.2. Innovative SMEs.100
The differences between innovative SMEs and traditional SMEs which intensify the problems101
of access to external financing of the former, have promoted several studies that test the results of102
capital structure theories in innovative SMEs. These empirical works have found coincidences and103
dissidence when evaluating whether the traditional theories explain the capital structure of innovative104
SMEs. Cassia and Minola (2012), find that companies follow the financial hierarchy theory in the first105
years of life, but then prioritize the capital increase instead of bank indebtedness. The same results are106
found by Minola et al. (2013) and Hogan and Hutson (2005). These last authors, highlight that this107
financial structure not only comes from financial constraints (on the supply side), but is a consequence108
of the preferences of the SMEs owners of innovators that, unlike traditional SMEs, they do not have109
a deep-rooted desire for independence, and as a consequence, they prefer to share the company’s110
ownership instead of borrowing in the financial system.111
Hogan et al. (2017), find that venture capitalists and angel investors are in second place, after112
domestic financing. Guercio et al. (2016) considering a group of innovative Argentine SMEs, find113
that first SMEs use internal resources and then finance their activities with current liabilities, mainly114
suppliers, and finally, loans from financial institutions. Ullah and Taylor (2007) find that funds from115
personal savings are listed as the main source of financing, followed by capital risk, and mortgage116
loans. On the other hand, Giudici and Paleari (2000) and Guercio et al. (2017), find that innovative117
firms use short term debt and commercial credit lines only in case that internal resources are not their118
sufficient to fund the investment projects. Pierrakis and Saridakis (2017) study the interaction between119
venture capitalists and other players of the innovation ecosystem, in order to overcome information120
asymmetries. In the course of the business life, firms can get access to other types of financing such121
as debt or capital increase. It is specially sensitive the financial constraints faced by innovative SMEs.122
Innovation is intrinsically a risky activity since it is concerned with the introduction of a new product,123
method, or device with an uncertain outcome. This situation turns financial decision riskier Coad124
and Rao (2008). Moreover, asymmetric information can preclude innovative unexperienced firms125
from external financial resources (Sullivan (2014)). In fact, credit scoring for micro-entrepeneurs126
relies heavily on information that is not easily available to the financial institution, in case of newly127
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established firms/individuals, as reported in Lanzarini et al. (2015 2017) and Jimbo Santana et al.128
(2018 2017). It is also critical the lack of hard collateral in most innovative firms, whose main assets129
could be intangible, and sometimes unuseful outside the firm itself (Mina et al. (2013)). Moritz130
et al. (2016) comment that innovative SMEs are more financially constrained given the huge risk131
of innovations, the informational opaqueness of the projects for external capital providers, and the132
low diversifications of SMEs possibilities (Ang (1992)). Takalo and Tanayama (2010) find that public133
Research and Development subsidies help to reduce the financing constraints of technology-based134
entrepreneurial firms in a double way: (i) reducing the financial amount requested to the banks, and135
(ii) signaling firms with promising projects.136
3. Data137
To pursue our research objective, we use microdata from the European Commission and European138
Central Bank, collected on the Survey on Access to Finance of SMEs (SAFE survey). This survey139
contains information of reliable financial sources of SMEs financing, since 2009.140
The survey is conducted biannually on a given set of questions. Each round is of a different type141
of survey. The more comprehensive one is done on all EU countries plus some neighboring countries.142
The limited survey is run on a limited number of euro area countries. Considering that the aim of this143
paper is to study SME financial constraints across time, we used the more comprehensive survey, in144
order to consider more countries. The years under analysis are 2009, 2011, 2013, 2014 and 2015.145
Moreover, the questionnaire includes the key question regarding the innovation done during the146
last twelve months for the firms, considering if they have introduced a new or significantly improved147
product or service to the market, or process or method, a new organization of management or a new148
way of sales. The whole sample includes data of around 40.000 companies in 28 European countries.149
See Table 1, in order to get detailed information on countries included.150
Table 1. Countries included in the sample
EURO AREA COUNTRIES OTHER EU MEMBER STATES
AT Austria BG Bulgaria
BE Belgium HR Croatia
CY Cyprus CZ Czech Republic
EE Estonia DK Denmark
FI Finland HU Hungary
FR France PL Poland
DE Germany RO Romania
GR Greece SE Sweden











Moreover, the survey encloses information related to SMEs characteristics such as size (the number151
of employers and turnover), sector, firm age, ownership, the fact that the firm is involved or not in152
product and/or process enhancement/innovation, and their recent financial sources requests. In153
addition, it contains information on the different financial instruments used by firms. Several works154
used this database previously (Öztürk, Bahar; Mrkaic (2014); Ferrando and Mulier (2015); Lawless et al.155
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(2015); Moritz et al. (2016)). For a detailed methodological information on this survey see European156
Central Bank (2017).157
The variables selected and their descriptions are represented in Tables 2 and 3. The variables158
considered in this work are those which, according to previous literature, influence SMEs financial159
access or affect their capital structure.160
Tables 4 and 5 show the percentage of firms that applied and accessed to a given financial161
instrument, at global and country level.162




Apply_cl Binary variable that takes 1 if the firm applied for credit line, bank overdraft or credit
card overdraft in the past 6 months and 0 if it did not apply. This dependent variable
shows the demand of credit line.
Apply_bl Binary variable that takes 1 if the firm applied for bank loans in the past 6 months and
0 if it did not apply. This dependent variable shows the demand of bank loans.
Apply_tc Binary dichotomous variable that takes 1 if the firm applied for trade credit in the past
6 months and 0 if it did not apply. This dependent variable shows the demand of trade
credit.
Apply_of Binary variable that takes 1 if the firm applied to other external financing in the past
6 months and 0 if it did not apply. This dependent variable shows the demand of
other external financing as loans from a related company, shareholders or family and
friends, leasing, factoring, grants, subordinated debt instruments, participating loans,
peer-to-peer lending, crowdfunding, and issuance of equity and debt securities
Access_cl Success in obtaining short term bank financing. It is a dichotomous variable that takes
1 if the firm obtained all credit line, bank overdraft or credit card overdraft that has
applied in the past 6 months and 0 otherwise. This dependent variable shows the access
of short term bank financing
Access_bl Success in obtaining loans. It is a dichotomous variable that takes 1 if the firm obtained
100% of the bank loan which has applied in the past six months, and 0 otherwise. This
dependent variable shows the access of long term bank financing
Access_tc Success in obtaining trade credit. It is a dichotomous variable that takes 1 if the firm
obtained all trade credit requested in the past six months, and 0 otherwise.
Access_of Success in obtaining other external financing. It is a dichotomous variable that takes 1 if
the firm obtained 100% of all other external financing requested in the past six months,
and 0 otherwise.
4. Methodology163
In this work, we use regression models for binary outcomes, given that the dependent variables164
are binary. We estimate two models, one of them to analyze the decision to apply for different financial165
instruments and the other one, to analyze the access to these financial instruments. The objective of166
this paper is to detect if the independent variables effect over the applied probability to some financial167
instruments and over the access probability are similar in both models.168
Binary logit models are used to estimate the outcome of the dichotomous variable, given a latent
variable. The latent variable y∗ is a linear function of the explanatory variables, using equation 1:
y∗ = xi β + µ (1)
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Table 3. Selected independent variables description
Independent
Variables
Turnover_micro It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firm’s turnover is up to 2 million euros; and 0 in another
case
Turnover_small It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firm’s turnover is between 2 million euros and up to 10
million euros; and 0 in another case.
Turnover_medium It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firm’s turnover is between 10 million euros and up to
50 million euros; and 0 in another case. (Base)
Industry It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firms belong to the industry sector; and 0 in another
case (Base).
Services It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firms belong to the service sector; and 0 in another case.
Trade It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firms belong to the trade sector; and 0 in another case.
Construction It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firms belong to the construction sector; and 0 in another
case.
Age5 It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firm’s age is up five years old and 0 in another case.
Age5_10 It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firm’s age is between five and 10 years old and 0 in
another case.
Age10 It is a dummy that takes 1 if the firm’s age is more than ten years old, and 0 in another
case.
Innova Dummy variable that reflects that the enterprise has introduced a new or significantly
improved product or service to the market or a new or significantly improved
production process or method in the last 12 months. It takes 1 if the answer is positive
and 0 otherwise.
Innova_micro Interaction binary variable between firm size and innova. It takes 1 if the firm is
innovative and micro, and 0 otherwise.
Innova_young Interaction binary variable between firm age and innova. It takes 1 if the firm is
innovative and up to five years old, and 0 otherwise.
Zone Dummy variable that classify countries. It takes 1 if the firm is in the Euro area, and 0 if
it is in a non-euro EU country.
ownership Dummy variable that takes 1 if the firm’s ownership is a family, and 0 otherwise.
Reatined Dummy variable that takes 1 if retained earnings or sale of assets are relevant sources
of finance of the firm, and 0 otherwise.
tc Dummy variable that takes 1 if trade credit is a relevant source of finance of the firm,
and 0 otherwise.
bl Dummy variable that takes 1 if bank loan is a relevant source of finance of the firm.
cl Dummy variable that takes 1 if credit line is a relevant source of finance of the firm, and
0 otherwise.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of selected dependent variables, for the whole database.
Zone apply_cl apply_bl apply_tc apply_of access_cl access_bl access_tc access_of
Euro area 26% 28% 20% 14% 58% 62% 60% 69%
Non-euro area 24% 19% 19% 14% 70% 64% 69% 70%
Total 25% 25% 19% 14% 62% 63% 63% 70%
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of selected dependent variables by country. Shaded cells highlight the
greatest and lowest value of each dependent variable.
Area Country apply_cl apply_bl apply_tc apply_of access_cl access_bl access_tc access_of
euro area
AT 27% 24% 11% 13% 72% 77% 77% 83%
BE 20% 29% 13% 11% 62% 73% 64% 73%
CY 20% 20% 25% 5% 31% 51% 41% 44%
DE 22% 24% 9% 16% 74% 76% 81% 91%
EE 10% 15% 7% 10% 53% 59% 40% 62%
ES 35% 35% 33% 17% 53% 53% 57% 57%
FI 11% 20% 15% 13% 74% 81% 84% 73%
FR 32% 35% 11% 16% 60% 74% 63% 77%
GR 13% 28% 27% 7% 22% 33% 35% 31%
IE 23% 18% 32% 13% 48% 44% 61% 50%
IT 36% 33% 27% 11% 56% 60% 68% 67%
LT 27% 26% 18% 15% 47% 51% 48% 48%
LU 31% 24% 7% 12% 77% 84% 83% 97%
LV 18% 13% 8% 15% 58% 42% 50% 69%
NL 17% 18% 14% 14% 35% 35% 42% 56%
PT 22% 20% 19% 9% 55% 59% 64% 63%
SI 38% 34% 9% 14% 58% 66% 63% 64%
SK 31% 20% 13% 15% 73% 61% 60% 72%
Mean euro area 26% 28% 20% 14% 58% 62% 60% 69%
non-euro area
BG 23% 17% 12% 10% 69% 57% 64% 54%
CZ 23% 22% 12% 14% 77% 70% 63% 75%
DK 23% 12% 8% 11% 64% 61% 69% 74%
HR 29% 30% 18% 23% 72% 63% 59% 80%
HU 25% 18% 8% 13% 70% 68% 61% 76%
MT 25% 20% 18% 6% 67% 64% 53% 29%
PL 29% 22% 30% 20% 79% 69% 72% 75%
RO 27% 20% 17% 10% 66% 56% 57% 59%
SE 8% 20% 8% 10% 60% 71% 72% 70%
UK 21% 15% 31% 16% 64% 65% 76% 70%
Mean non-euro area 24% 19% 19% 14% 70% 64% 69% 70%
Mean all countries 25% 25% 19% 14% 62% 63% 63% 70%
Max all countries 38% 35% 33% 23% 79% 84% 84% 97%
Min all countries 8% 12% 7% 5% 22% 33% 35% 29%
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The higher the value of y*, the greater the probability of occurrence of the event. In our case, the events
are the probability of applying for a bank loan and the probability to get the application approved.
The observed variable is related to the latent variable y∗ in the following way:
yi =
{
1 if y∗i > 0
0 if y∗i ≤ 0
(2)
So, the event probability is defined as:
Pr(yi = 1|x) =Pr(x, β + µ)
=F(xβ)
(3)
Where F is the cumulative distribution function for the logistic distribution with variance π2/3.169
The binary regression model is nonlinear. The independent variable effect over the dependent variable170
depends on its own value and on the whole variables included in the model. Therefore, it is not171
possible to obtain only one coefficient for each independent variable. Consequently, the interpretation172
of relationship between independent and dependent variable is not valid. Then, in this work, we173
interpreted the results with predicted probabilities. Given that, all independent variables are categorical.174
Furthermore, we use the profile estimation probabilities. Different profiles are created considering the175
main interesting firms’ features for this research. In this sense, different values for the independent176
variables are fixed. Consequently, the change in the predicted probabilities related to each profile can177
be observed.178
5. Empirical Analysis and Results179
Table 6 presents the descriptive statistics of the interaction of variables reflecting financial180
application or access and innovation. It can be observed that innovative firms (independently of181
size, age or other characteristics) apply more for financial aid than non-innovative firms. These182
proportions are statistically different at 1% significance level. However, it can be observed that183
innovative firms are less successful regarding effective financial access than non-innovative firms.184
These proportions are statistically different at 1% and 5% signficance level, depending on the financial185
instrument.186
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of selected financial application and financial access dependent variables,
interacting with innovation characteristics of the firms.
Application Access
Financial instrument Innovation Financial instrument Innovation
apply_cl Innova=0 Innova =1 Total N access_cl Innova=0 Innova =1 Total N
0 77.44 71.25 74.67 22716 0 36.10 39.47 37.81 2816
1 22.56 28.75 25.33 7674 1 63.90 60.53 62.19 4595
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 30390 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 7411
Pearson chi2 = 123.8560; p-value= 0.000 Pearson chi2= 4.1734; p-value= 0.041
apply_bl access_bl
0 78.26 72.58 75.74 30050 0 34.64 39.53 37.09 3501
1 21.74 27.42 24.26 9625 1 65.36 60.47 62.91 5962
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 39675 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 9463
Pearson chi2= 140.2956; p-value= 0.000 Pearson chi2= 11.8621; p-value=0.001
apply_tc access_tc
0 82.24 77.19 80.02 24710 0 34.93 37.38 36.16 2172
1 17.76 22.81 19.98 6178 1 65.07 62.62 63.84 3862
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 30888 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 6034
Pearson chi2= 109.7303; p-value = 0.000 Pearson chi2= 4.1123; p-value=0.043
apply_of access_of
0 88.15 83.30 85.99 29767 0 28.04 31.02 29.63 1436
1 11.85 16.70 14.01 4846 1 71.96 68.98 70.37 3351
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 34613 Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 4787
Pearson chi2= 133.2070; p-value = 0.000 Pearson chi2 = 4.1546; p-value=0.042
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Table 7 presents the obtained results of the logit model for the different financial instruments:187
credit line, bank loan, trade credit and other financial instruments, and the independent variables188
detailed in Table 3.189
Our results detect that micro firms have a negative significant coefficient, meaning that being190
a micro firm affect negatively the probability to apply for the different financial instruments. With191
respect to small firms, this characteristic affects more the effective financial access rather than the192
application for external financial aid.193
The firms’ age variable is significant for those firms that have more than five years. Older firms (5194
or more years old) ask less for trade credit lines or other financial resources. However, they are better195
at effectively securing any kind of external financial resources. In other words, for firms that present a196
wide seniority in the markets, the probability to demand a trade credit and other external financial197
instrument decreases, but their effective financial access increases.198
The fact that firms have innovated in a process, product or service affects positively the probability199
to demand financial sources. The same result is obtained if the firms use internal sources.200
Respect to the sector that the firms belong to, and considering the industrial sector as categorical201
base, the probability to demand bank financing, regarding short term instruments (credit lines) and202
medium and large terms (bank loan) sources and finance through trade credit diminish if the firms203
belong to the service sector.204
The firms that belong to the trade sector affect negatively the probability to demand a bank loan205
and other external financial instruments. The construction sector affects positively the probability to206
demand credit lines and trade credit.207
According to these results, if the firms are family businesses, they have higher probabilities to208
apply to trade credit. Respect to the other financial instruments, this variable is not significant.209
Table 7 also presents the results of the probability estimation of SMEs that have accessed to the210
financial source demanded previously. In the same line as the probability estimation of demand, the211
firms’ size is significant for all the instruments considered. Therefore, micro and small firms diminish212
the probabilities to access to external finance, such as the theory of the capital structure predicts.213
Moreover, if we consider the productive sector of the firms, belonging to the trade and construction214
sectors diminishes the probability in accessing a bank loan or a trade credit with respect to the industrial215
sector. Also, belonging to the construction sector affects negatively to the access to credit lines.216
The firms age is positively correlated with the probability of access. Firms that are between 5217
years old or more present higher probabilities in accessing credit lines, bank loans or trade credit than218
those that are less than 5 years old (base category). Moreover, the probability related to the access to219
other financial resources is higher for firms that are 10 or more years old than those that have less220
seniority.221
The probability in accessing a credit line, a bank loan or trade credit diminishes if the firms222
innovate. However, innovative firms are better at accessing other financial resources. In general, we223
observe that innovative firms have higher probabilities to demand financial instruments but fewer224
probabilities in accessing them. These results could indicate that innovative firms present higher needs225
of external financial, but their access is limited.226
In order to analyze the goodness of fit, the likelihood of the model (with and without the intercept),227
the McFadden R2 and the probability of success (Count) are calculated. The results show that in all228
estimates the Log-likelihood Model is greater than the Log-likelihood Intercept-only. The p-value of229
LR (dif=10) indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected. The model is explained only by the constant.230
The McFadden and the McFadden (adjusted) indicate the goodness of fit of the model for the data is231
based on the comparison of the likelihood of the model only with the constant, with the likelihood232
of the model with all the estimated parameters. Finally, the Count compares the values observed233
in the sample with those predicted in the model. In all cases, the Count Index is high (above 0.5),234
indicating that there are a high number of cases in which the prediction derived from the regression235
model achieves what is observed in the sample.236
Version February 25, 2019 submitted to Int. J. Financial Stud. 10 of 14
Table 7. Logit model with dependent variables Apply and Access to the different financial instruments.
Variable apply_cl apply_bl apply_tc apply_of access_cl access_bl access_tc access_of
turnover_micro -0.0492* -0.5090*** -0.3813*** -0.4243*** -0.4697*** -0.5635*** -0.1935*** -0.5669***
turnover_small 0.111*** -0.1419** 0.0000 0.0285 -0.1977** -0.1603*** -0.1477*** -0.1341
services -0.1430*** -0.1241*** -0.4777*** 0.0344 -0.0671 -0.0982 -0.0470 0.1142
trade -0.0477 -0.1172*** 0.00000 -0.3830*** -0.1039011 -0.0926** -0.1595** 0.0015
construction 0.1239*** 0.0025 0.0825** -0.0452 -0.1955** -0.1837* -0.2995** 0.0482
age5_10 0.0811 0.0016 -0.1594* -0.1174* 0.3329*** 0.3043* 0.1972* 0.0756
age10 -0.0610 -0.0164 -0.1781*** -0.2384** 0.3088*** 0.2811*** 0.3165** 0.2713**
innova 0.2853*** 0.2653** 0.2321** 0.3151*** -0.1913*** -0.0468** -0.1532*** 0.1416**
ownfe -0.011 -0.043 0.3051 * 0.0244 0.0479 0.0482 0.1286* 0.0964
zonaeuro 0.1567*** -0.4945*** 0.0000 0.0204 0.5576*** 0.5589*** 0.4353*** 0.0725
retained 0.9712*** 0.2133*** 0.2827*** 0.2471*** sig (+)*** 0.1001 0.1468*** 0.0265
cl . 0.2133*** 0.5057*** 0.3871*** . 0.3602 -0.1204*** -0.0428
bl 0.2741*** . 0.42502*** 0.3951*** sig (+)*** . 0.1291*** 0.1959***
tc 0.2741*** 0.2927*** . 0.2614*** sig (-)*** -0.2480 . -0.2980***
Statistics
N 30697 39675 30888 34613 7411 9463 6034 4787
ll_0 -17,392,319 -22,032,052 -15,531,546 -14,068,061 -49,198,196 -6,239,248 -39,465,984 -29,207,251
ll -16481 -20846859 -14728661 -13506 -47819828 -6107242 -38925855 -28642493
chi2 17,935,252 22,758,842 15,305,323 11,305,754 26,135,698 25,665,082 10,355,111 11,025,484
r2_p 0.0524 0.0538 0.0517 0.0400 0.0280 0.0212 0.0137 0.0193
aic 32,990,199 41,721,718 29,485,322 27,041,999 95,919,657 12,242,484 7,813,171 57,584,986
bic 33,106,846 41,841,957 29,602,055 27,168,779 96,887,158 12,342,656 79,070,433 58,556,034
We created different firm profiles, according to size and engagement into innovation activities.237
These profiles present the same characteristics respect to the sector (all of them belong to the industrial238
area), use of internal source to finance their activities, the firms are not family businesses, and they239
belong to the euro area.240
The aim of the profile analysis is to evaluate the change in the probability to apply different241
instruments according to size and innovation. Consequently, we could determine the archetype firm,242
which is more or less affected in financial application and access. The different firms’ profiles are243
presented in Table 8.244
Table 8. Firms’ profiles
Profile Characteristics
1 Micro innovative firm
2 Small innovative firm
3 Medium innovative firm
4 Micro not innovative firm
5 Small not innovative firm
6 Medium not innovative firm
Considering the profiles created, the probability of firms demand for each instrument has been245
created. The aim of this result is to show a compact vision of each profile result and the financial246
instruments. The probabilities obtained are presented in Table 9, in decreasing order for each financial247
instrument. For example, regarding financial application, Profile 2 has a probability of 0.5559. This248
means that among all the firms within profile 2 (Small=1, Innova=1), there is a probability equal to249
0.5559 to apply for credit line. At the same time, firms within Profile 2, which actually applied for250
a credit line, have a probability of 0.5491 to really access to the credit line they have requested. The251
probability to access a given financial instrument was computed only with the firms that actually252
applied for such instrument. We can observe that, in general innovative firms (Profiles 2 and 3) show253
greater probability to demand external financial aid. However, non-innovative firms reach the highest254
positions regarding the effective access to financial instruments (Profiles 5 and 6). If we look at firm size,255
micro firms (Profiles 1 and 4), irrespective of innovation activities) demand less and access less external256
finance. If we focus simultaneously on firm size and innovation, micro innovative firms (Profile 1)257
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have one of the lowes application probability and the lowest financial access in all instruments. It is258
observed that medium firms (profiles 3 and 6) present higher probability in accessing any instruments259
than micro firms (profiles 1 and 4), as the financial theories predict.260
Table 9. Predicted probability of financial application and access
Financial Application
Credit line Bank loan Trade credit Other finance
Profile 2 0.5559 Profile 3 0.5863 Profile 3 0.4624 Profile 2 0.3755
Profile 3 0.5284 Profile 2 0.5516 Profile 2 0.4498 Profile 3 0.3688
Profile 5 0.4848 Profile 6 0.5209 Profile 6 0.4055 Profile 1 0.3152
Profile 6 0.4572 Profile 5 0.4855 Profile 5 0.3932 Profile 5 0.3049
Profile 4 0.4450 Profile 1 0.4600 Profile 1 0.3701 Profile 6 0.2989
Profile 1 0.2876 Profile 4 0.3952 Profile 4 0.3178 Profile 4 0.2181
Financial Access
Credit line Bank loan Trade credit Other finance
Profile 6 0.6425 Profile 6 0.6563 Profile 6 0.6284 Profile 6 0.7364
Profile 3 0.5975 Profile 5 0.6193 Profile 5 0.5934 Profile 5 0.7095
Profile 5 0.5959 Profile 3 0.5998 Profile 3 0.5920 Profile 3 0.7080
Profile 2 0.5491 Profile 2 0.5608 Profile 4 0.5822 Profile 2 0.6795
Profile 4 0.5292 Profile 4 0.5209 Profile 2 0.5559 Profile 4 0.6131
Profile 1 0.3932 Profile 1 0.4604 Profile 1 0.5445 Profile 1 0.5329
6. Conclusions261
SMEs are the engine of the economies. Their share in gross domestic product and employment262
creation is highly relevant. The financial structure of this type of firms has been frequently studied in263
the economy literature. Asymmetric information produces serious problems, which preclude several264
SMEs from easily accessing external resources. This paper explores not only the variables related to265
the financial current access, but also the variables that affect the application for financial resources.266
We found several interesting results. First, firm size affects both the demand and the effective267
access to finance. In this sense, the smallest firms have fewer probabilities in applying for and accessing268
to the all-financial instruments considered in this work. Second, we observe that innovative firms269
have higher probabilities in demanding financial instruments but fewer probabilities in accessing270
them. These results indicate that innovative firms present higher needs of external financial, but their271
access is more limited. Among the problems cited in the literature that magnifies the access to finance272
in this kind of firms are the uncertainty regarding the innovation process, long times to delivering273
the products, intangibility of the main assets of the firms, and the difficulty of reproduction of the274
processes, outside the original firms. This paper detects that the demand for external finance in this275
kind of firms is greater than non-innovative firms, widening the gap between financial supply and276
demand.277
Since the seminal paper by Schumpeter (1942), economists know that innovation is a key economic278
development driver. Enhancement in productivity, and gross domestic product growth is only the279
visible part of the whole iceberg, known as “innovation”. In fact, innovation produces a deep spillover280
effect on society, improving employment quality, and diversity and quality in products and services.281
Consequently, economic policies should be oriented to ease the financial access to SMEs. Even282
though European countries have been developing joint efforts towards it, this paper uncovers that283
such efforts have not been sufficient in order to improve the intermediation mechanisms between the284
financial sector and innovative firms. Therefore, a greater effort and a closer involvement of policy285
makers with SMEs are considered necessary.286
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